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The Moral Failure of 
Clinical Legal Education 
ROBERT CONDLIN 
This paper discusses some undesirable effects of the "clinical" education 
movement on the teaching of professional ethics in law school. Specifically 
two questions are considered: (1) Why was clinical education expected 
to be a superior means for teaching professional ethics to law students? 
and (2) How well has that expectation been met? Section I defines 
clinical education. Section II synopsizes the currently prevailing argu-
ments for the superiority of clinical instruction in professional ethics. •· 
Section III analyzes the theory of education that clinical instruction 
presupposes, reports on empirical research about teacher-student be-
havior patterns in clinical instruction, and describes how those behavior 
patterns could lead to the development in students of ethically ques-
tionable or inappropriate habits and beliefs. Section IV looks more 
closely at the origins of clinical education in speculating about yvhy 
clinical education has failed. Section V concludes with proposals for 
reform. 
I 
Clinical legal education is defined typically as instruction in interpersonal 
skills (e.g., interviewing, counseling, negotiation) and professional ethics 
(the moral principles that regulate the behavior of lawyers in role) in 
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the context of student fieldwork (representation of actual clients with 
live cases in law offices created by law schools for this purpose) under 
the supervision (systematic, critical analysis of student work) of a lawyer/ 
law teacher. 1 Each of the emphasized elements is important, and the 
absence of any one weakens the claim that instruction is clinical. Most 
clmical programs established during the last two decades follow this 
model. 2 
It must be added that a wide range of other types of practice-related 
instructional programs are called "clinical."3 These programs include: 
practice court simulations of litigation (particularly trial) problems that 
students are asked to act out;4 ad hoc faculty-student research into 
litigation and law practice skills; 5 extracurricular volunteer work for legal 
aid offices, "public interest" organizations, and government agencies, 
often called "internships";6 equivalent uncompensated (except through 
course credit) work for private law firms, sometimes described as 
"downtown seminars"; 7 practice-skill exercises grafted onto substantive 
law courses and usually referred to as II clinical components";8 and 
classroom cognitive instruction (sometimes interdisciplinary and with 
or without parallel simulation exercises) in the interpersonal processes 
of law practice.9 
Clinical education differs in two ways from apprenticeship training, 
the form of lawyer education replaced at the end of the nineteenth 
century by the university law school. 10 It looks for content more to the 
interpersonal dimension of law practice-its psychology and ethics-than 
to its administrative tasks (e.g., finding the courthouse); 11 and it gives 
critical self-analysis of student work priority over the absolute quality 
of that work. 12 This emphasis on psychological and ethical subject matter 
and critical self-analysis has important practical consequences. For ex- •· 
ample, students in clinical programs work on fewer cases, examine more 
dimensions of their cases, and have less responsibility for initiating and 
carrying on discussions about their work than did neophyte lawyers in 
apprenticeship training. 13 
Clinical education is also commonly described as a new teaching 
methodology, the components of which are: "1) student assumption and 
performance of recognized roles within the legal system; 2) teacher 
reliance on this experience as a focal point for intellectual inquiry and 
speculation; and 3) motivational tensions which arise out of ordering 
the teaching-learning process in this way."14 There is no doubt that 
clinical instruction proceeds through this methodology. Whether the 
methodology is new to law teaching is not so clear. The above elements 
seem equally constitutive of the so-called "Socratic dialogue" -a first-
year law-school teaching method in which students take on the law-
firm associate role of intellectual apprentice and solve analytical puzzles 
within a mentor's definition of a problem. The roles assumed in first-
year and clinical courses differ greatly, but the two teaching methodologies 
are conceptually more alike than different. 15 
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What seems most innovative about clinical study is its use of the 
unstructured and multidimensional world of law practice as a setting,I6 
· and its explicit consideration of interpersonal dynamics as a subject. 
These attributes add a new set of questions and a rich new source of 
data to the study of doctrine, policy, and analytical technique that have 
heretofore made up the study of law. 
Measured in volume of course offerings, clinical education has con-
stituted the most substantial change in legal education in the last two 
decades. 17 Starting from voluntary, unsupervised, extracurricular student 
practice in the legal aid offices of a few law schools (e. g., Pennsylvania, 
Denver, HarvardV 8 clinical education reached a high-water mark in 
1977 when 139 law schools reported 494 programs of instruction set 
in 57 substantive fields of law. 19 (The numbers for 1978 and 1979 are 
roughly the same.)2° From 1970 to 1976 alone, the number of schools 
reporting clinical programs grew by 39 percent, the number of programs 
by 192 percent, and the fields of law in which programs were offered 
by 307 percent. 21 The number of law professors reporting clinical 
education among their teaching interests in the Directory of Law Teachers 
grew from 107 in 1971 to over 700 today. 22 In legal education, the 1970s 
were the decade of the clinic. 
II 
The first question I would like to take up 1s this: Why was it expected 
that clinical education would be a superior means of teaching professional 
ethics to law students?23 
I shall begin with a typology of ethical problems faced by lawyers, 
taken from Richard Wasserstrom. Vvasserstrom identifies two basic ethical 
problems ·for lawyers: ~U}h~ J~YQQlt:r:El_~~L_!?~'l.l~ipulation-"that the [ ob-
ligation of zealous representation triggered 15y1"-1h'e] ~la'Wyer-client rela-
tionship renders the lawyer at best systematically amoral and at worst 
more than occasionally immoral in his or her dealings with the re~t of 
mankind"; and-~a.LtJ;:g:_pr~~£1g_m .. QLQQlDl[lCit.~9f1:::-"that . . -: the lawyer-
client relationship [itself] ... is morally objectionable because it is a 
relationship in which the lawyer dominates and in which the lawyer 
typically, and perhaps inevitably, treats the client in both an impersonal 
and a paternalistic fashion." 24 Wasserstrom sees these criticisms, if well 
founded, as fundamentat and I agree. 25 They suggest, among other 
things, that law practice involves treating both clients and third parties 
instrumentally, that is, subordinating their personhood to the lawyer's 
desires. They raise issues of whether professional expertise will be used 
to restrict rather than enhance client autonomy26 and abuse rather than 
respect legitimate rights of third parties. Ironically, these issues receive 
virtually no mention in the Code of Professional Responsibility_27 Yet, 
as one commentator put it, "These are crucial matters with enormous 
impact on law practice."28 
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Clinical education, it was believed, would confront these ethical 
problems in two ways, one substantive and the other .methodological. 
Substantively, clinical education would analyze the interpersonal skills 
(e.g., interviewing, counseling, negotiation) of law practice. This sub-
stantive focus was supposed to make explicit the student's moral stance 
toward clients and third parties and, in the words of one commentator, 
· "compel the examination of personal ethics, morality and individual 
conceptions of professional role."29 In this view, ethical issues were seen 
as !r:t~~-s.a E<!.~ly. ~~J:?~gg~g_jp t5?53.l1~s.-c5Ilnterpersonal tec1ui.ique :. iE··y:ra.s· 
not thought possible to consider questions of what ·would work, without 
simultaneously considering questions of what was right. · · 
This expectation was not farfetched. J:_l:J.~..s.l~sgJ!D.~J~ytwg~£1 ethis~ 
~0_9.~ts:J::.hniq_ll~iu ___ <;:.lini!:=al.~tpgy cap be seen in accounts of the nature 
of clinical practice. 
Often becaus~ of the time the students spend in the research of their 
problems, they come face to face with the possibility of using some 
technical plea to win or delay a case. This gives the staff members an 
opportunity to discuss with the students the lawyer/s responsibilities to 
the client/ the public and the court in the use of technical pleas where 
delay is the only thing that can be gained. If time is needed for factual 
investigation or for better preparation of the case, discussion is had as to 
whether or not a delay is proper through a technical plea. Is it proper to 
use such where the purpose is to drag out the case to force a settlement?30 
Our experience with students in a clinical setting suggests ... a number 
of troubling phenomena. . . . [T]hey experienced considerable difficulty 
with their role as attorneys, and with the interpersonal, emotional di-
mensions of the problems they encountered. This went deeper than the 
archetypal questions of professional responsibility courses/ e.g., Should I 
defend a man who admits his guilt? Should I prosecute a man under a 
statute with which I disagree? Should I allow a witness to testify when 
I suspect that he is not telling the truth? These questions, of course/ were 
present in abundance/ and generated the feeling common among practi-
tioners that the people who wrote the rules never had to function under 
them. What was also present/ however/ in far less resolvable form, were 
questions totally ignored in the Code of Professional Responsibility and 
in legal education. To what degree can or should I impose my judgments 
on the client's perceptions? How do I control my fear, anger, and syJ:'!lpathy 
for the client? To what degree are my judgments influenced by class, race, 
and caste? In negotiating/ when does my manipulation of perception, 
uncertainty, and attitude become "dishonesty," or go beyond the limits 
of proper conduct?31 
The link between technique and ethics also appears in the ostensibly 
psychological literature in which clinical study is grounded. 32 The principal 
clinical coursebook devotes one-third of its total pages exclusively to 
discussions of professional ethics and professional responsibility, and 
discussions of ethics and technique are intermingled freely throughout 
the remainder of the book. 33 Similarly, textbooks about lawyer skills 
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discuss both types of issues interchangeably to a lesser but still significant 
degree. 34 One commentator even conceptualized the subject of profes-
sional responsibility in terms of a psychological taxonomy, suggesting 
that the study of professional ethics was appropriately the study of the 
internal psychological and emotional conflicts that ethical dilemmas 
presented,35 while anot_her called the "application of ethical canons to. 
specific case:'i" a practical lawyering skill. 36 
This blending of psychology and ethics in the clinical literature is 
understandable. The ethicist and the psychologist often deal with the 
same data and-·asFsimilar--queslions:37--Each ts····cortcerned --(in ·social 
relationships) with divisions of power and responsibility, the limits and 
uses of authority, the clarification and expression ··of values, the· issues 
of do~ination and manipulation, and the enC:().tiia_geme!lt of autonomy 
and free choice. - · ·· · · · ' ' 
~en--the other hand, effectiveness, including effectiveness at psycho-
logical "technique," and goodness are not always the same, particularly 
when relationships are multiparty (e.g., client-lawyer-adversary) and 
obligations vary or even conflict. One person's effectiveness can be 
another person's oppression._Qii].~QJJc;,ations ... .pJQ.PE;D.§J!Y _to wor~ 
wit_h psycho1()gi~_al.__(~()Jl}~ ~~.SllJ.~ig~ .9f_P?Iitical and _philosophiCal) 
con-cepts may prevent it from iden_tifying an~ cs)nsid~ringsucKpi9b~¢!?1-s, 38 
· and prevent it from taking full advantage of factors such as the lawyer's 
charaCter in directing and restraining lawyer behavior. 39 
Perhaps even more important than this substantive approach to ethics, 
clinical education confronts ethical issues methodologically as well: 
clinical stu9,ents actually practice law.40 Moral issues are thus raised in 
ways that differ from those of traditional instruction in three crucial" 
respects: (1) the issues are confronted in the first person, in the lawyer's 
role, with ready-made motivational tensions-instead of Pi and Delta 
and their lawyers, the parties are real and their lawyer is l; (2) the 
problems appear in the full richness of a real-life factual situation; and 
(3) all student work is done as part of a bilateral partnership with a 
skilled practitioner/teacher, who models appropriate behavior at ,the 
same time that he or she criticizes student performance. "' 
The central feature of this process is its conscious use, both in theory 
and practice, of the dynamics of role adjustment. This process generates 
a number of epistemological and motivational consequences of enormous 
importance. For example, "experience produces a qualitative change in 
the mode and content of knowing, which cannot be replicated by the 
transmission of information or the discussion of cases ... in a classroom. 
The way in which ideas are understood after they have been used feels 
different in a sense that is not fully explained by the fact that they are 
more readily remembered."41 This is particularly true of ideas about 
values, much of whose content is lost when understood in a purely 
intellectual way. 42 
The process of role adjustment also triggers a need to know and 
justify. The necessity of performing an unfamiliar task produces a strongly 
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felt desire for some cognitive framework for coping with the anxiety 
that unfamiliarity generates and giving consistency and coherence to 
one's behavior. Since role adjustment is intimately tied to the student's 
sense of self, the motivational energy generated by this need is very 
high. 43 
These epistemological and motivational consequences alter the teacher-
student relationship. To be sure, traditional law teachers are responsive 
to student demands to be sources of competency, understanding, and 
entertainment, yet few students formulate these demands critically, 
concretely, and coherently. This freedom of faculty pronouncements from 
critical scrutiny is in part attributable to the absence of any shared 
teacher-student context or frame of reference within which criticism 
could be formulated. Clinical teaching provides this context, in the form 
of a shared law-practice world, in which students gain confidence, 
knowledge, and critical perspective through performance with their 
teach~rs of lawyer role tasks. This, in turn, increases student scrutiny 
of faculty pronouncements. 44 
In the same vein, clinical work requires choice and judgment to a 
degree absent in other law-school instruction. Students are responsible 
for the choices that are the subject of clinical teaching and must live 
with the consequences in a way that makes the problem of responsibility 
a meaningful concern.45 As Meltsner and Schrag note: 
Issues of professional responsibility ... loom large on the clinical agenda . 
. . . Should they [the students] drown adversary litigators in a sea of 
paperwork, lie to adversaries for bargaining advantage, or decide, as a 
legal aid lawyer, to represent one type ofclient rather t0an another when 
resources are too scarce to represent both? Clinical courses are superior 
vehicles for sensitizing students to these issues, because the student must 
actually make a choice among competing options. Unlike the student in 
the classroom, he cannot stop after pointing out the risks and .costs inherent 
in each available course of action, but must actually select one of them, 
execute it, and incur the associated costs. His decision may well be 
irreversible, and he will have to live with its consequences for weeks or 
months thereafter. 46 
Underlying the foregoing substantive and methodological points are 
two foundational claims, one psychological and the other philosophical. 
While infrequently voiced, these claims are in my opinion implicit in 
any plausible argument for the superiority of clinical education for 
teaching professional ethics. 
The psychological claim grows out of the work of Erik Erikson47 and 
has to do with the way that adults develop values. The claim responds 
to the sotto voce criticism of legal ethics courses that,~'qnly a fot:)l_w()uld 
suggest that [a] law teacher CSJU~c:iJS'.h<:i.?.L;:l.J\>veptLye~r old liar or do 
much else aoout'ln€t'Iundamental values which- his erl.vironm~nt has 
. in:sfilled m h1rn.''48 --·' . ' 
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To some extent this criticism is valid. By the time a person reaches 
the age of twenty, her or his personality is \Nell set. Yet, the development 
of jden_~ity49 _i.T1 __ th~ __ _tw~nt.t~JJ:Lcentury has_ underg~wnar7\.1an-st~ 
·callsa ''cruCial v:ariation.'.' 50 ou:r--·s-6C1~t.)(-proloftgs ·adoles-cen~e 'by:·ex:::--
rending education, wJ:1j):h in. turn delays role commitments (such as 
OCCUpatlo~af.chOlCe) at_tendant On adultstatUS.51:rJi~s,· ·major partS of a 
'persgn'$ _ident.ity_£I~.1~PL9J?.~PJ.2L~l!!.t~.AJQngc.t.~mt:}t is in "lfiese·-·apen· 
~ar-eas-including commitment to .and definitionoloq::l1pati()n?l~e>.les~that 
professional ethics instruction can have a significant impact. 
Because law s~~dents do not usually think explicitly about their roles 
as la\!Vyer§, tbe d(C>yelop:rnen! ofJheir professionalj_cienti~y results largely 
from emulation of role models-those who are respected, or in some 
cases feared or hated; for their performance of lawyering roles _52 The 
. nee~J2IQp.riatEL-m.o.d_els__~-jpJ~.D~gJ.y_j_~!_t, .§.£._g'!:~c11 so that. almost 
··arlobservations of experts_ acting_in rol~s,,£Qtt\_~l}. __ a[l9:-~~~f3?I,'J~~-:~sb9c:il; · 
will affect the pr6fessi6nar chara.·aei::'shaping of la_'Y" .§tudentst_Jhi.s. is 
why ideas about _£I2L~£§i.QI1fiLbiliav:i.OLgath~:r.edi:t9rn·2E.9.:Stising la~s~ 
~d--law-iacillJf~e,_re~.graspe.d.oc.eagerly~and .. imi.tq.teci .. HYJS1h::,_~t:Y~~---~hen 
suth practices border on the.,unethical. · · · · 
·· Of all law-school instruction, clinical programs are designed best to 
exploit the process of role-model emulation for teaching about professional 
ethics. In observing ethically scrupulous lawyers acting in recognized 
lawyer roles, students are required to make the fewest translations or 
transpositions of instructional messages. They have an exact model of 
the behavior they are to emulate. And they have an opportunity to try 
out that new behavior under the observation of a skilled supervisor to 
make whatever adjustments are necessary. Little coulct be done to improve' 
upon such a design. 
The foundational philosophical claim, which traces its roots to Ar-
istotle,53 has to do with the way that virtue is known. Following Kelly,54 
I shall call it the "activist view." It holds that only someone who has 
had the experience of acting in a certain way is capable of knowing 4 
the principle embodied in that way of acting. Principles are arrived at 
by reflection upon activities that have been experienced p:rereflectively 
and internalized as dispositions. 
A person learns virtues by imitating good people and good actions. 
Critical reflection on what is learned, to articulate and harmonize habit 
with principle, is an important but chronologically second step in the 
process. The neophyte, who is being inculcated in virtue by imitating 
virtuous acts, need not (and in fact cannot) be aware at first why it is 
that the acts imitated are virtuous; rather it is enough to do them because 
"good" people make her or him do them. After a while the habit of 
acting in a good way becomes one's own. At this point the student of 
virtue has made part of her or his moral potential a disposition, and 
when he or she then reflects upon the nature of the good actions he 
. or she can understand their virtuous character. Until disposition is 
present, the moral character of action cannot be fully understood. 
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The intellectual activity involved in moral matters is thus a kind of 
practical wisdom, a capacity for judging particulars on the basis of 
dispositions informed by deliberation. This faculty is what helps one to 
decide what to do when different sorts of values that are not necessarily 
commensurable all bear on the situation.55 Because the content of moral 
principles is not fixed independently of activity, however, without the 
requisite experience even an intellectually gifted person is not capable 
of knowing such principles. 
If one believes in activist moral epistemology, it seems indisputable 
that the clinic provides the ideal setting for the moral education of 
lawyers. Only in clinics can students imitate the good actions of good 
lawyers responding to moral conflicts and then reflect on their response 
in the company of a good supervisor. And only by experiencing and 
then reflecting on what it is to act correctly as a lawyer can they come 
to understand and articulate a principled ethical viewpoint. 
It should b.e apparent that the arguments for clinical instruction in 
professional responsibility are arguments about potential, not results. 
The arguments do not claim that existing clinical programs provide 
superior instruction in professional ethics, just that such programs could, 
if used properly. There is no hard evidence that students trained in 
clinical programs behave more virtuously than students who have not 
taken such courses. Even the first-person reports of student clinical 
learning turn out to be remarkably unsubstantiated when examined 
closely. The foregoing arguments taken as a group, however (since none 
are mutually contradictory), make out a strong prima facie case for the 
efficacy of clinical instruction in professional ethics. 
III 
This brings us to the second question: How well has the expectation 
for clinical instruction in professional responsibility been met? This 
question may be read in two ways. The first asks whether the ethical 
content of clinical instruction has effectively taken hold. Do clinical 
students behave in practice as they are instructed in the clinic? I do 
not know the answer to this question and shall say nothing about it. 
The second asks whether the content of clinical instruction ought to 
be learned .. Do clinical teachers model behaviors that are ethically 
admirable? To this question my answer is, "to a large extent, no." The 
remainder of this section is an attempt to defend this answer, which 
may surprise those who find convincing-as I do-the arguments of the 
preceding section. 
To begin, let us look more closely at the theory of education implicit 
in the preceding section. It views clinical learning as a felicitous com-
bination of two models, which may be described as "learning by doing" 
and "learning by imitating." In the first model, the student practices 
law, interacting with clients, adversaries, witnesses, judges, social workers, 
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etc. -call this group the "cast." The teacher observes these interactions 
as an objective outsider and gives the student commentary. We may 
represent this situation as follows (the solid line indicating interaction, 
the broken line indicating observation): 
"Learning by doing" 
Teacher 
I 
I 
t 
Cast -------+- Student 
In the second model, the teacher practices law (by intervening in the 
student's cases, dividing the work with the student, etc.) while the 
student looks on to see how it is done: 
"Learning by imitating" 
Student 
I 
I 
t 
Cast ------ Teacher 
Both of these models of learning are part of the Eriksonian and 
activist approach in that they are two components of a process that 
focuses on actual interactions as the vehicle for education. The problem 
is that these two models stop halfway in applying this approach. They 
assume that the actual interactions from which the student learns are 
interactions with the cast. These models restrict their moral psychology ., 
and epistemology to the solid arrows in the diagrams. What is omitted, 
ironically enough, is the vast bulk of interactions between teacher and 
student. The student engages with the cast only intermittently, but with 
the teacher constantly. Thus, a better way to draw the diagram is this: 
T 
~ s~ 
c------s c-----T 
Like Poe's purloined letter, this fact is so obvious that it can be 
invisible. But once we turn our attention to teacher-student interactions, 
it is apparent that moral education in the clinic also derives from students 
emulating their teachers' behavior in interactions with the student. In 
effect, the student takes the place of the client and regards the teacher's 
way of treating her or him as the sort of behavior in which a good 
lawyer engages. 56 In addition to the content the teacher intends to 
convey by analyzing the student's engagement with the cast, or by 
engaging with the cast her or himself, the teacher's interactions with 
the student also help to form the student's moral dispositions toward 
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the practice of law. And it is in this domain that clinical education 
failsY 
My views on this matter derive from the analysis of scores of hours 
of taped supervisory sessions between clinical students and their teachers. 58 
I was particularly struck by one feature of these interactions, namely, 
that as pieces of behavior they themselves exemplified the patterns that 
Wasserstrom identified as morally troubling. It began to look as though 
clinical teachers and students differ from traditional law teachers and 
students only in that they are even more zealous at modeling and 
imitating dominating and manipulative behavior. 
To demonstrate this, I must begin by sketching the view of ethics 
that I presuppose. This view is drawn from the work of Jiirgen Habermas, 
Richard Rorty, and Hannah Arendt. 59 Each of these philosophers em-
phasizes the close connection between the moral point of view and 
dialogue. Moral reasoning aims at a certain universality; it attempts to 
discover and ,..appeal to norms that are binding on all agents, in all 
situations. To do this, one must develop the ability to "think ... from 
the standpoint of somebody else."60 Even solitary moral reasoning tries 
to replicate in thought a dialogue among different points of view. Such 
a dialogue aims at a rational consensus among uncoerced individuals 
in speech situations minimally distorted by socially or psychologically 
induced communication barriers. It imposes certain requirements on its 
participants. They must make explicit to each other the nature of their 
ends (which include affective reactions to practical situations) and their 
plans for adapting available means to those ends. They must explore 
ambiguities in, and articulate evaluative responses to, each other's 
formulations, responses to those responses, and so on, until consensus 
is achieved. 61 .. 
The purpose of this recursive communication process must not be to 
win or to silence others. Its purpose is to understand and to produce 
uncoerced agreement, if agreement is the appropriate outcome. Moral 
discourse, in short, attempts to achieve consensus on the legitimacy of 
ends and the rational relationship of ends to means (evaluating ends 
and means in each other's lights) through a process of communication 
that is public, bilateral, critical, and cooperative. In a previous article 
I have discussed the cluster of behavioral characteristics that make up 
such discourse under the rubric the "learning mode."62 
Now, it is noteworthy that observed discourse in clinical practice 
instruction regularly had few of these characteristics. Clinical teachers 
and students often competed over the authorship of ideas, concealed 
their ends and plans for achieving them, attributed (without investigation) 
meanings to others' ambiguous formulations, argued for preferences 
subliminally and indirectly, suppressed strong but relevant feelings, 
"protected" each other from difficult but necessary topics by ignoring 
such topics altogefher, argued for beliefs in needlessly stylized and 
hyperbolic ways, and feigned agreement to produce illusory consensus 
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when underlying belief was the opposite. 63 Discourse of this sort is also 
associated with a set of behavioral traits that I have called the //persuasion 
mode. 064 
At first glance, the persuasion mode seems to describe competitive 
law-school styles of discourse previously identified. 65 However, the 
behaviors I observed are different in some important respects. First, 
persuasion-mode behaviors are more complex. It is not just that clinical 
teachers and students act competitively and insensitively. 66 They also 
tend to make decisions unilaterally, to keep their agendas private, to 
dissociate themselves from responsibility for failure, to intellectualize 
all questions, to argue coercively (if subtly so), and to seal themselves 
off from data about their own ideological constraints and ineffectiveness. 
These behavioral traits combine to form a self-contained and self-
sustaining world in which all parts work in symbiotic relation with one 
another. The ideology that these behaviors embody allows teachers and 
students to agree with criticisms of law-school dialogue without realizing 
that their own dialogue is among the objects of those criticisms. 67 
Second, in themselves persuasion-mode behaviors are not always 
inappropriate. Each of the behaviors has its place in law-teaching 
relationships in which it is both effective and proper. The behaviors 
are double-edged, however: when they are used in inappropriate settings 
they do great damage. A competitive response to a bright and self-
confident student practicing verbal word-play spurs growth. The same 
competitive response to an inarticulate and nervous student making her 
or his first public statement has the opposite effect. 
Third, the meaning one gives to persuasion-mode behaviors depends , 
very much on one's vantage point, and multiple vantage points exist. 
Few teachers intend to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their 
students; few are unfeeling; few compete over interpretations of work 
product just to win. Yet many are perceived in these ways. Because of 
the setting68 almost anything that teachers and students say or do is 
ambiguous. Each communication has several plausible meanings, ranging 
from the most positive to the most negative. 69 The most common scenario 
begins with a teacher statement intended as helpful but heard as an 
attack. The student, concerned about being attacked, responds defensively. 
The teacher does likewise, for the same reason, eventually creating the 
reality of a joint attack, often from an initial situation of mutual 
agreement. 70 The process of successive misinterpretation works slowly 
and subtly, but to the ultimate effect of distorting discourse and producing 
illusory consensus. 
The problem underlying this process, shared in equally by teachers 
and students, is communicative incompetence. 71 Neither teachers nor 
students understand the complexity of the messages that they send. 
Neither side hears its own words from the perspective of the other. The 
other's inappropriate responses are taken as literally intended, rather 
than as partly produced by plausible though erroneous constructions 
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of the first person's remarks. The ultimate breakdown of dialogue is no 
less real than if pursued intentionally, but perceptions of culpability are 
different. Each side believes, with some justification, that it joins the 
attack reluctantly and in self-defense. It is hard to say how these teachers 
and students would respond if they were aware of their own role in 
distorting instructional dialogue. But this response must be known in 
order to evaluate their capacity for and interest in moral discourse. 
Fourth, the persuasion mode is not always associated with bad, 
unpleasant, aggressive behavior. The mode is just as often a low-visibility, 
indirect, and even cordial method of manipulating others. A person 
argues for outcomes that are "in the other person's best interest." That 
they are also identical with the first person's desires is not acknowledged, 
to either person. Nonverbal information corroborates the genuineness 
of the first person's concern because, at one level, a persuasion-mode 
actor convinces even her or himself of her or his identification with 
the other. The persuasion mode is used among friends as well as enemies, 
and people feel good about it as often as they feel resentful. Persuasion-
mode behavior can be overtly belligerent and aggressive, of course, and 
in lawyers the mode is usually identified with these characteristics. But 
the true test of persuasion-mode behavior is in what it seeks to accomplish 
(e.g., victory rather than understanding or uncoerced agreement) and 
by what strategies (e.g., private, unilateral, competitive, and self-sealing 
actions rather than public, bilateral, cooperative, and self-reflective ones). 
It is substance, not form, that gives the persuasion mode its identity. 
It is understandable that clinical teachers would slip tacitly into a 
persuasion-mode style. Clinical teachers, more even than traditional law 
teachers, are charged with teaching "adversarial skills"72 to students. 73., 
They must train students to control conversation-by getting others 
either to agree or not to disagree-until the ability becomes a reflex. In 
other words, students must learn to convince others or silence them on 
command, and teaching these skills is a necessary undertaking. In the 
formal, stylized, rule-bound, and arms-length world of law practice, 
doing justice in particular cases frequently requires the manipulation of 
persons in whom decision power is reposed. 
The most effective way to teach adversarial skills is by drill. Thus, 
clinical teachers use such skills pervasively in conversations with students 
in which real student interests are at stake. This encourages students 
to protect their interests by responding in kind. The repetitiveness and 
relentlessness of this process is what causes the skills to take hold. It 
may be that for most clinical teachers this is not a consciously chosen 
strategy. But its ubiquitousness in clinical instruction suggests that it is 
a real strategy nonetheless. 
In the clinical instruction that I studied, persuasion-mode behaviors 
were learned unself-consciously, as a set of disembodied means, not as 
part of a larger moral system that includes constraints on the use of 
such means. Nor was the development of persuasion-mode habits 
The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education 329 
tempered by the concurrent development of learning-mode habits. The 
result of such unbalanced instruction can be morally disastrous. 
The internalization of predominantly persuasion-mode habits can 
cause a person to interpret most social relationships in persuasion-mode 
terms. 74 This interpretation will produce few moral problems in rela-
tionships of strategic interaction 75 (e.g., zero-sum bargaining, courtroom 
argument, witness examination) where the objective is known by all to 
be instrumental success, but will produce moral chaos in relationships 
of friendship, trust, and dependence (e.g., client interviewing and coun-
seling, working with colleagues, witness preparation) where one side 
expects to share power and responsibility while the other side moves 
to seize them. The problem is one of teaching habits with limited and 
specific uses as if they were appropriate responses to all law practice 
relationships. 
The following examples of persuasion-mode behaviors illustrate both 
their beneficial effects in appropriate settings and harmful effects in 
inappropriate ones. 
1. A persuasion -mode actor assumes that meaning in communication 
can and should be produced unilaterally, by attributing single meanings 
to ambiguous statements. This assumption allows her or him to recast 
adversary arguments into forms that are easier to rebut. But used in 
nonadversarial relationships, the assumption demeans the importance 
of colleagues and clients as necessary and unique contributors to the 
knowing process, and encourages one to see these others as types rather 
than persons. 
2. The habit of taking charge, particularly by indirection and sub ., 
rosa strategies, allows one to alter the direction of group action adverse 
to one's interests while minimizing resistance to that alteration by not 
letting on that that is being done. Yet, in client and colleague relationships, 
habitually taking control can lead to paternalism and arrogance. It can 
cause one to impute rather than explore others' ends, shut off rather 
than encourage legitimate objection, ignore rather than raise debatable 
but relevant issues, and accumulate rather than share decision-making 
authority. 
3. Persuasion-mode habits encourage one to see problems brought 
to lawyers as technical, admitting of single, optimum solutions knowable 
by experts. This disposition enables lawyers to plunge confidently into 
complicated intellectual and emotional tangles between clients and 
adversaries without fear that resolution is not possible. Frequently, this 
sort of confidence, stemming from a belief that a technical answer exists, 
would have aided clients and adversaries in their efforts to resolve the 
problem by themselves. However, another consequence of a technical 
world view is that the idiosyncratic, subjective value preferences of 
clients are demeaned in choosing what ends to pursue and by what 
means. 76 The result is that lawyers, as technical experts, often dominate 
choice in ways that do not respect the moral autonomy of clients. 
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4. Persuasion-mode habits cause a person to argue forcefully, hy-
perbolically, and at length. These are often useful traits in the courtroom 
or at the bargaining table, but in assessment or planning sessions with 
colleagues they diminish the importance of good reasoning. Similarly, 
attributing meaning and forming evalu_ations quickly and automatically 
are of value in the rapid-fire dialogue of the courtroom, but in law-
office planning sessions where time is not of the essence, they produce 
simplistic thinking. Complex phenomena are needlessly reduced to some 
of their parts, and tentativeness and uncertainty are unnecessarily 
suppressed. Persuasion-mode habits cause one to know where one stands 
on an issue at the moment it is raised. But many moral questions need 
not and cannot be so quickly resolved. 
5. Persuasion-mode habits enable a person to minimize self-analysis 
and to reserve it for private moments when it will not weaken instrumental 
effectiveness. Successful argument in negotiation or trial requires the 
speaker's own conviction in what is said, manifest in behavior and 
demeanor as well as in words.77 Self-analysis introduces doubt, tenta-
tiveness, and complexity all of which weaken conviction and the ability 
to manifest it in self-serving answers. However, this same disposition 
can also promote moral irresponsibility, for the persuasion-mode actor 
avoids self-analysis of her or his own responsibility for the failure of 
undertakings in relationships where candor is more important than 
conviction. The self-sealing properties of persuasion-mode habits, how-
ever useful in bargaining and argument, reinforce this irresponsibility. 
A persuasion-mode actor avoids acquiring a critical perspective on the 
ideological properties of her or his moral stance. Thus, the inevitable 
biases of class, sex, race, religion, region, and wealth embedded in the 
actor's world view are more likely to be acted upon uncritically. "' 
6. Persuasion-mode habits predispose lawyers to take evaluative stands 
automatically, as a first response to others' new ideas. This causes them 
regularly to make statements that, on reflection, they know to be false. 
Many of these statements will produce sizeable gains for both client 
and lawyer (victory, authority, status, wealth), and the habit of taking 
quick though erroneous stands can be predicted to produce continued 
gains in the future. But the repeated experience of deriving benefit from 
less-than-truthful statements may also wear down loyalty to accuracy 
and fairness. Persuasion-mode habits may weaken one's general dis-
position to seek and speak the truth. 
7. Finally, persuasion-mode habits cause one-understandably in com-
petitive contexts-to hedge bets, cut losses, and pick winnable fights. 
But such habits may inhibit bold moral action by encouraging one to 
avoid risks. To be sure, calculated risks are often inherent in good 
strategy. But to be moral one sometimes must stand on principles unlikely 
to win competitive success, and sometimes take a stand when competitive 
success is out of the question. Because a person with persuasion-mode 
habits tries to be secure in her or his choices, autonomous moral action 
often may be impossible. 
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These attributes, taken together, make up a kind of instrumental 
morality that causes a persuasion-mode actor to define interactions as 
competitive and, above all else, to value winning and fear losing. Positive 
legal rules are the only check on such a person's behavior, morality is 
collapsed into legality, and maximizing to the limits of one's constraints 
is the operative moral code. 78 These problems, again, arise not with 
persuasion-mode habits in their own right, but with such habits learned 
as disembodied means in isolation from some larger moral system. 
Unfortunately this was the very pattern that troubled me in my analysis 
of clinical teacher-student interaction. 79 
A final qualification is in order. Clinical students' reasons for using 
the persuasion mode differed . from those of their teachers, and these 
differences suggest that teachers are more responsible for the present 
state of affairs. Students are concerned about performing well in their 
new role of lawyer. The psychological dynamics of role adjustment make 
this concern inescapable. Clinical practice is as close as most students 
get in law school /to acting in lawyer role. In this practice, the student's 
standard for how he or she measures up is the clinical teacher. These 
factors combine to make the teacher's behavior a powerful influence on 
students' beliefs about how they should act. 
There seems to be a threshold period in which the student, following 
the teacher's suggestions, defines "performing well" as using effective 
interpersonal technique. Effective technique, as we have seen, means 
being reflexively good at manipulating interpersonal exchanges. Students 
practice manipulation, often enthusiastically, not because they enjoy or 
believe in it (some no doubt do, but many do not), but because they .-
want to learn to be effective lawyers and manipulation is what their 
teachers have told them effective lawyering is all about. The students 
do not know whether the teacher is right and must either take her or 
his direction on faith (for the moment) or argue against it. The cost to 
the student of arguing, at this stage of development, is substantial; he 
or she will probably lose the argument and in the process also forgo 
the opportunity to learn as much as possible about fundamental processes 
of law practice, at a time when it is easiest to learn. This learning can 
give either a more sophisticated and defensible understanding of what 
is wrong with the teacher's conception of law practice, or a thorough 
grounding in a conception of a professional role that the student ultimately 
accepts. There is a logic to taking the teacher's direction and waiting 
to criticize. I suspect, also, that most students wait because they believe 
that they will not be sucked in, that is, that they will not lose their 
critical moral perspective. This judgment is wrong more often than it 
is right, but it is not usually wrongly motivated. 
Two other factors play a role in a differential assessment of student-
teacher responsibility. In this threshold learning period students are poor 
manipulators. They are not yet skilled at the process and their sentiments 
intrude. The effect often is that clients (or others with whom the students 
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interact) are not so much oppressed as amused. Moreover, the students 
do not benefit significantly in a material way from their manipulative 
labors. They are given little individual authority (all work must still be 
reviewed, every action cleared in advance) and reap no economic return. 
They remain as ·poor, or poorer, at the end of the semester as at the 
beginning (even in the search for jobs-clinical experience is of ques-
tionable value on a resume), irrespective of how well they manipulate 
others. 
I do not suggest that the lack of mean spirit, ability to manipulate 
effectively, and economic return insulate a clinical student from immoral 
action; just that these factors make a student's manipulative action 
morally different from that of a teacher who no longer wonders whether 
he or she is competent, who manipulates skillfully, who has achieved 
significant status as a consequence, and who has had adequate opportunity 
(usually not taken) to discover that manipulation is not always the 
morally best,.course. It seems easier to say that the teacher should have 
known the nature of her or his action, and that he or she has chosen 
a course of action because he or she values it for itself and for what 
it produces. This is not to say that the environmental pressure to 
manipulate is weaker on the teacher than on the student only that 
there is a plausible explanation of the student's behavior-it is a decision 
to learn and grow-that is not present in the case of the teacher. 
IV 
If my analysis is correct, it raises another question: How could an 
instructional program committed to the responsible, bilateraL and critical •. 
study of ethics end up proceeding by passive, subliminaL and manip-
ulative technique? To answer this question it is necessary to look more 
closely at the origins of clinical education. 
Clinical education did not start primarily as an educational reform. 80 
It was not the product of an insight about law-school instruction, and 
it did not originate with persons knowledgeable about or particularly 
concerned with education. 81 It started as a movement for social reform. 
Legal educators happened to be caught in its net because they seemed 
at fault for not correcting the serious social harms that the legal system 
produced and because they and their students were a major untapped 
resource in the movement for reform. 82 Only later was the inadequacy 
of legal education in ethics seen as part of the problem. 
The clinical revolution started in the 1960s and 1970s with money 
from the Ford Foundation channeled through a series of grant-making 
agencies. 83 Between 1963 and 1978, Ford funded programs of every 
size, shape, and substantive law orientation at almost all law schools 
that asked for them. The purpose for which these clinics were funded 
changed subtly over the years, even though the stated purpose remained 
the same-the support of law-school instruction in "professional re-
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sponsibility." //Professional responsibility" would turn out to be a slippery 
term. 
In the early years of its funding of clinics, Ford defined professional 
responsibility as consisting in "the distribution of ... legal services to 
all segments of the public including the poor," and the bringing about 
of "legal and social reform."84 Instruction in professional ethics (i.e., 
the moral norms that regulate the personal relationships of law practice) 
was recognized as a subsidiary goaL but systemic political reform was 
emphasized. 85 
The National Council on Legal Clinics, Ford's first grantee, was an 
administrative creation of the National Legal Aid and Defender Asso-
ciation (NLADA), to whom the grant was in effect made. 86 The money 
was used to support law students who worked as clerks in legal aid 
offices; interns in juvenile and family courts; and observers in mental 
hospitals, social agencies, and police departments. 87 The purpose of this 
grant seems to have been to help NLADA in its beleaguered efforts to 
provide free legal representation (mostly criminal defense) to indigents. 88 
The right to counsel in criminal cases was being expanded and the 
demand for representation by indigent criminal defendants outstripped 
the supply of free defense counsel. 89 Clinical students were seen as a 
resource in NLADA's efforts to meet this demand through both the 
students' specific clinical contributions and the predicted increase in 
volunteer representation by lawyers who would have been "sensitized" 
to poor people's problems by clinical programs.90 
In this emphasis Ford was only mirroring popular opinion. The period 
in which clinics proliferated was the period of the civil rights movement 
and the "War on Poverty." The politicaL social, and legal temper of 
the times was reformist. There was widespread belief, not without cause, 
in the reformist powers of law and lawyers. 91 Ford believed that law 
students who worked in the legal system and saw first-hand the difficulties 
that the system visited upon the poor would, as a result, work for 
substantive law reforms. 92 Legal clinics were seen primarily as a means 
to this social end rather than as a vehicle for the reform oj instruction 
in professional ethics. 
Law schools proved receptive to this educational innovation. The 
changing temper of the times challenged traditional conceptions of the 
role of the lawyer and of the law school. 93 Prominent psychiatrists on 
law faculties and articulate junior faculty discussed legal education's 
dehumanizing tendencies at (sometimes great) length in scholarly jour-
nals. 94 Legal education, it was charged, had to become more "relevant," 
personal, humane, and egalitarian. The classroom dialogue process was 
criticized as excessively theoretical, abstract, intellectualized, and hier-
archical, and law prof~ssors were attacked for being smug, impersonal, 
sadistic, and hostile. 95 
Law faculty reaction to these criticisms was varied. Some professors 
had no immediate response and, after a few belated defenses of the 
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old order, withdrew from the debate. 96 A few never participated. Many 
disagreed with the criticisms of law schools, and even more regarded 
the proposed clinical reform as intellectually shoddy and faddish.9 7 But 
eventually the largest number of law teachers agreed that something 
needed to be done. 98 They viewed the second and third years of legal 
instruction as generally unsatisfactory and were willing to experiment 
with programs that showed promise. 99 
Clinical education came to be viewed as such a program. Work on 
"real" cases, it was argued, would make "abstract theorizing" relevant100 
and the need for analytical skills obvious, and thus have ripple effects 
in traditional law courses. Responsibility for client problems and a one-
to-one relationship with a teacher would encourage a bilateral expression 
and investigation of feelings as well as ideas, and thus make law study 
more egalitarian and personal. 101 "Learning by doing" would reduce 
the difficulty of motivating students to learn and thus make law study 
more fun. Al1 of these arguments had obvious appeal. 
It also helped that no other proposal for legal educational reform 
was as suited to the times. The movement for interdisciplinary law 
study had peaked for law and psychology102 and had not yet caught 
on for law and economics. 103 The most substantial interdisciplinaryeffort, 
the policy sciences movement, popular at some elite law schools-notably 
Yale-in the 1940s and 50s, had proved too remote from the day-to-
day practice concerns of most law teachers and students to command 
broad-based support. Besides, these programs were vulnerable to the 
same epithets-"irrelevant/' "theoretical/' "impersonal" -leveled at tra-
ditionallaw teaching. 104 And Ford was willing to foot the bill for clinical 
teaching. 
A concern with systemic reform continued to dominate Ford's definition.-
of professional responsibility through the life of the Council on Education 
in Professional Responsibility (1965-68) and the early years of the Council 
on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) (1968-74). 
Although the term "professional responsibility" was retained, Ford's 
objective carne to be stated more frequently as providing legal "services" 
to individual poor people, rather than reforming law. This change in 
meaning of the terminology may have reflected movement in the direction 
of professional ethics, because in 1974 CLEPR changed its emphasis 
and announced that it would fund legal clinics primarily for the purpose 
of providing instruction in professional ethics. 105 
Whether this shift can be attributed to new insight, 106 changing times, 
or strategic choice is hard to say. Beliefs in the "sensitizing" effects of 
representing poor people began to look romantic as time passed and 
agitation by lawyers for social reform diminished. On the other hand, 
professional ethics was a long-standing and poorly taught course in the 
standard curriculum, and having a better way to teach it was a firmer 
foundation than social reform on which to pin one's argument for a 
place in the academy. It is clear, however, that a subtle but real shift 
in justification for clinical programs occurred. 107 
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One might ask why it matters that Ford did not start and proceed 
with a clear and consistent plan for reform of ethics instruction. If 
clinical education is the most effective way to teach professional ethics, 
isn't that what counts? This would, after alL not be the first time that 
an agency set out to improve upon the clothesline and invented the 
telephone. It mattered in this instance, however, because Ford's shifting 
purposes confused legal educators. In particular, they did not know 
what standards to use in deciding whom to hire to administer their 
clinical prograrns.I 08 
It was not clear, for example, whether clinical teachers ought to have 
academic qualifications and research interests similar to those of tra-
ditional teachers, or whether law-practice experience was an appropriate 
substitute. If practice experience was a substitute, should that experience 
be of complex law-reform litigation, or would experience with individual 
clients on small-scale, self-contained problems suffice? Should clinical 
teachers be expert in professional ethics, or was it enough that they 
understood strategic, lawyering technique? These and other such ques-
tions either were not answered, or were answered simplistically, con-
fusingly, and inconsistently over time by those who spoke for Ford.I 09 
One effect of this lack of clear and consistent direction from the 
funding source was that law schools took the safest short-term but 
riskiest long-term course. They hired people whose previous work 
experience was closest in outward form to the day-to-day law-practice 
obligations of clinical instructors. I IO Since most clinical work was done 
for poor people, this meant that a high percentage of new clinical 
teachers carne from the ranks of the Neighborhood Legal Service~s 
Program for the poor. I I I 
This was a safe short-term choice because these lawyers had proven 
that they could successfully manage the type of lawsuit on which they 
would work with students. It was a long-term risk because, with some 
notable exceptionsY 2 they had not shown any critical perspective on 
this representation process. They did not have law-practice research 
agendas nor articulate theories of law practice. For the rnos_t part, these 
lawyers/teachers had a view (often quite sophisticated) of the proper 
technique of law practice, a belief that law school had not helped them 
in learning this technique, and an understandable desire to pass on 
what they had learned to law students. Critically examining their own 
first premises, in public, against an ideaL for the purpose of understanding, 
was a less familiar process. In short, many of the early clinical teachers 
conceived of themselves as lawyers whose task was to practice law 
jointly with law students, not as academics whose work also included 
understanding and elaborating upon the nature of law practice. 
Two additional characteristics of many of these early clinical teachers 
contributed to the problem. The first was that many clinical teachers 
did not have an articulate theory of instruction. (Some would dispute 
this because it contradicts clinical teachers' own account of themselves.) 
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They were committed to the process of "learning by doing," but they 
were noticeably vague about what the "doing" was supposed to involve. 
Their individual theories of instruction may have been no more than 
catalogues of maxims dictating avoidance of those practices they had 
found unpleasant in their own legal education (e.g., teacher sarcasm, 
ridicule, criticism, and impersonality). If so, their understanding of the 
defects in legal education was symptomatic and may have caused them 
to produce a symptomatic reform. 
The second characteristic was that many clinical teachers were more 
the product of their own legal education than they had realized. Without 
knowing it, they had internalized the traditional law-school commu-
nication habits that they criticized and may have honed those habits in 
law practice. When they returned to law schools as professors, in their 
own way, they replicated these objectionable practices, substituting covert 
for overt manipulative, instructional technique. Being committed to 
teaching differently but not themselves being fundamentally different, 
many clinical teachers altered only the outward form of legal education, 
leaving its underlying substance intact. 
The above factors also combined to prevent a high percentage of 
clinical teachers from seeing and overcoming their initial limitations. 
Not having a developed, alternative vision of law instruction, but believing 
that they did possess one, clinical teachers reacted angrily to suspicion 
and criticism by traditional law teachers of both CLEPR and clinical 
teachers. This reaction produced what might be called a Kremlinizing 
effect. Like Soviet bureaucrats, these clinical teachers divided the world 
into a beleaguered "us" and a menacing "them." On this world view, 
clinicians do one thing and traditional teachers do something totally .. 
different. Neither group likes the other, and each avoids the other 
altogether when it can. Traditional teachers hold the power in law 
schools because of historical accident and use that power to perpetuate 
themselves, largely by denying full faculty status to a sufficient number 
of clinical teachers. Traditional teachers talk about standards, scholarship, 
and intellectual content, but that is no more than an elaborate smoke 
screen for what, at its root, is an unadorned power play to preserve 
the dominance of the traditional law-teaching role. Some traditional 
teachers are sympathetic, but they are few in number and unrepresentative 
of law teachers generally. Most traditional teachers are hostile, not 
because they want to be, but because they need to protect the only job 
that they know how to do. 
This is the world view of far too many clinical teachers. It produces 
a profound intellectual and emotional insularity in those who hold it 
that cuts them off from knowledge of their own limitations and makes 
serious consideration of those limitations almost impossible. The fact 
that much of it is overstated does not weaken its hold.m 
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Two final questions must be answered. Should law schools continue to 
use clinical programs to teach professional ethics? And if so, what can 
be done to reduce the risk of such programs graduating unself-conscious 
instrumentalists? 
The first question is easy. Understanding doctrine is different from 
understanding virtue. Virtue must become habit and disposition before 
it can become principle, and this process takes place best in the context 
of interpreted lawyer role-adjustment experiences. The alterna-
tive-analysis of hypothetical ethical dilemmas-is to the learning of 
ethics what riding in ski-lifts is to the climbing of mountains: all form 
and no substance. 114 
But how clinical programs can avoid graduating instrumentalists is 
more difficult to answer. The problems I have described are fundamental. 
They evince a deep-rooted and basic failure of much of clinical instruction 
to live up to its potential as a vehicle of moral education. The potential 
is there, and it would be a mistake to give up on it. But reforms are 
needed if the self-perpetuating and destructive patterns I have described 
are to be interrupted. Unfortunately, suggesting programmatic reform 
is a larger task than I can hope to address here. My recommendations 
are intended only as a modest first step toward altering two conditions 
that feed the problem. 
The first condition is the woefully underdeveloped and one-sided 
intellectual content of much clinical teaching about ethics. Too many 
clinicians rely on a small stock of shopworn, persuasion-mode ideas, 
and seem to be unfamiliar with learning-mode alternatives. For example, 
it is inconceivable that clinical teachers with sophisticated views about 
ethics could be unaware of the problems of manipulation and domination 
that Wasserstrom has identified. These are watershed issues. Yet the 
clinical literature, 115 and the behavior of clinical teachers I have studied, 
all too often evidence only simplistic understandings of tpese issues 
generally and no awareness of their manifestations in clinical teaching. 
This lack of sophisticated understanding is a clinical Achilles' heel. 
The only teaching ''method" that succeeds over time is the triumph of 
content. The ethical content of clinical instruction needs to be criticized, 
tested, and reformulated, and multiple intellectual perspectives on this 
content need to emerge. 116 It cannot any longer be thought sufficient 
to teach a clinical course as a series of ad hoc reactions to the ethical 
issues that arise in a set of randomly (or even carefully) selected cases. 
Clinical teachers drawing upon their distinctive vantage point, must 
identify that core set of behaviors, concepts, theories, analytical frame-
works, and insights about ethics that is the essence of their instruction, 
and these elements must always be part of clinical course offerings. 
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The development of this content is the responsibility of all clinical 
teachers. It cannot be lek as it has in the past, to a handful of productive 
and innovative thinkers. This means, most significantly, that more 
individual teachers must communicate and defend their ideas in the 
journals. There must be the unfettered debate from many perspectives, 
some to prove mistaken, that is characteristic of the healthiest subjects 
of study. If this does not occur, clinical instruction in ethics is living 
on borrowed time, and the fact that the gallows is not yet built does 
not change that. 117 
The second and related condition is the inadequacy of clinical research 
methods. Most clinical scholarship is "empirical," in that it is based on 
observed clinical experiences. Yet most of those experiences are reported 
in the form of authors' summaries of what students did and paraphrases 
of what students said. The difficulty with this data is that a reader 
cannot tell what actually happened or whether he or she would have 
summarized the clinical experiences in the same way. And the well-
known distorting effects of perceptiort, memory, expectation, and in-
tention are rarely considered. 118 That this writing is usually self-laud-
atory-every clinical program is described as an unmitigated success, 119 
and there are no ''carefully documented failures" 120-adds to the reader's 
suspicion. 
Clinical teachers should reject the temptation to reminisce about a 
semester. The random recalling of anecdotes is not empirical research. 
More clinical teachers must begin to generate data that has a substantial 
claim to objectivity. To do this, at least in the immediate future, it will 
probably help to work with others trained in empirical research, forming 
cross-disciplinary alliances within the university. 121 This practice should 
have the added effect of breaking down the insularity, described earlier, "' 
that is too frequently the hallmark of contemporary clinical study. 
Better scholarship and research methods by themselves, however, are 
only part of the answer. It is possible to understand and agree with 
Wasserstrorn's critique, and yet still use persuasion-mode behaviors 
inappropriately in one's communications with students. Even teachers 
sensitive to the problem need to monitor and evaluate their commu-
nication practices on a regular basis (and many do), if those practices 
are not to add a layer of distortion to their instruction about ethics. 
Making teacher-student communication a conscious subject of clinical 
study is the easiest way to do this. 
This means that more than just a handful of clinical teachers must 
study both ethics and their own teaching of ethics. On this second level, 
they must identify the persuasion- and learning-mode properties of their 
communication practices with one another and evaluate the appropri-
ateness of those practices to the situations in which they arise. Ideally, 
teachers and students would correct inappropriate behavior. But if that 
is not possible (e.g.,. because underlying dispositions are too strong), 
they must still identify the behavior for what it is, acknowledge its 
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inappropriateness, and do as much as they can to meliorate or nullify 
its undesirable effects. 
In studying oneself teaching there is the risk, of course, that the 
parasite will swallow the host. The analysis of teacher-student com-
munication cannot be continuous or predominant. The majority of the 
time in the clinic must be spent in the study of lawyering. Trying to 
be actor and observer simultaneously is similar to what Bernard Williams 
has described as trying to find a "mid-air position," that is, a framework 
outside all frameworks. 122 It will not work. There is no such position. 
But if the analysis of teacher-student communication is kept within 
bounds, it blends naturally with the analysis of student-cast interaction. 
The two complement and build upon one another. 
In studying themselves, clinical teachers need models. This process, 
like learning virtue, depends upon the development of habit as well as 
the articulation of principle. This is perhaps the most difficult need to 
satisfy. Self-reflective learners do not abound in law teaching, 123 and 
clinicians may have to look elsewhere to find them. Fortuities excepted, 
this is likely to be a slow and frustrating search. In the interim, ·clinicians 
might find models in the critical literature. Some of this scholarship is 
written from the perspective of the individual actor and describes critical 
self-learning in graphic detail. 
In the end, rational dialogue is a major part of the "good" that is 
modeled in clinical instruction. And such dialogue has as necessary 
preconditions the articulation of principles and the critical analysis of 
the process by which those principles are articulated. I emphasize these 
preconditions because I believe their neglect has done the most to 
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